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INTRODUCTION

I

Presidents have been issuing signing statements—in which they comment
upon aspects of legislation they have signed into law—since the Monroe
administration. Until recently, the practice went largely unnoticed. That changed
with President George W. Bush, who thus far has issued signing statements
relating to more than 1,000 statutory provisions, more than all prior presidents
combined.1 He has done so as part of a broad strategy designed to expand his
authority generally, and specifically to preserve his ability to challenge Congress
on controversial issues such as interrogation techniques. The sheer volume, as
well as the context and tone, of this administration’s use of signing statements has
brought this practice into the public spotlight, and generated a great deal of
criticism. The criticism has been largely legal in nature. That is, it has been
rooted primarily in legal/constitutional arguments that signing statements in
which a president declares an interpretation of legislation contrary to that of
Congress, or his view that aspects of legislation are unconstitutional and therefore
should not be enforced, violate the constitutional provisions establishing the
separation of powers between the judicial and executive branches. This paper
briefly addresses these legal arguments, and concludes that, when measured
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T.J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional
Implications (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007) 9-12. 16
Dec. 2007 <http://www.coherentbabble.com /signingstatements/CRS/RL336679172007.pdf>.
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against established legal principles, it is evident that signing statements do not
violate the Constitution.
The principal focus of this paper is on a second, non-legal analytical
dimension: the efficacy of signing statements as policy. It analyzes signing
statements, as one commentator has put it, as a method for political—as opposed
to legal—constitutional construction.2 It concludes that the use of signing
statements by the current administration to advance its construction of the
president’s constitutional authority has not been a successful policy. This is
because the administration’s policy has lacked the characteristics necessary for its
constitutional construction to succeed in the long term, while at the same time it
has produced serious and disruptive political issues that have hampered the
administration in advancing its agenda.
A two-dimensional assessment of signing statements—both as policy and
in terms of their constitutionality—provides a superior analytical tool. The
widespread criticism of signing statements is not satisfactorily answered or
explained by the traditional legal analysis—like trying to fit a round peg into a
square hole. However, viewing them as a political policy strategy provides a
broader and more complete perspective.
This two-dimensional approach can be illustrated as follows:

2

Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999).
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Conventional wisdom has confined policy analysis to squares one and four of the
diagram. This has created a false dichotomy that associates good policy with
constitutionality and bad policy with unconstitutionality. Some examples of
issues that have been subject to this dichotomy are racial profiling, affirmative
action, strip searches and drug testing. At some point in time, each of these
policies have been challenged as violations of the Constitution. In the 2003
Supreme Court case Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court found that the University of
Michigan’s admission system gave too much weight to race and ethnicity.3 While
affirmative action as a policy is a feasible and effective way of increasing
diversity – a well intentioned policy – it was heavily scrutinized as a violation of
the equal protection clause in the 14th Amendment. Policy analysis is not a “black
and white” issue as legal arguments for many of these issues would suggest. The
unduly narrow view used in traditional analysis underutilizes available analytical
tools and unnecessarily limits the resulting conclusions. Making cells two and
three available remedies this limitation, and enables greater analytical clarity.
3

Gratz v. Bollinger, no. 02-516, Supreme Ct of the US, 23 June 2003.
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Utilization of the entire diagram allows for a more complete perspective of
policies. While policy and constitutionality are related, they are analytically
distinct. A policy is judged based upon its effectiveness, feasibility and a costbenefit analysis. The constitutionality of a policy is based upon application of
constitutional principles as prescribed by case law. A policy can offer benefits
that outweigh the costs to implement, be effective in addressing its goals, be
totally feasible and yet never be employed because it is deemed unconstitutional.
Examining constitutionality and policy separately creates the opportunity to
modify a beneficial but unconstitutional policy so that it can be implemented
without being termed illegal. In turn, using the policy-constitutionality diagram
can help prevent the implementation of a constitutional, but bad policy.
The false choice that the conventional dichotomy creates is the idea that
the effectiveness of a policy must correlate with constitutional legality. As seen
with signing statements, this dilutes the underlying issues and restricts the
assessment of policies. Application of this two-dimensional construct to signing
statements provides a concrete illustration that a policy can fall within the
parameters of the Constitution and still be a bad policy. By framing signing
statements as policy, it becomes clear that the underlying issue is how they work
as policy. And many of the legal arguments being made for or against signing
statements are, in fact, founded on the policy debates.

5

PART I
The Constitutionality of Signing Statements
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SETTING THE STAGE:
Signing statements against the backdrop
of separation of powers

II
The argument that presidential signing statements are unconstitutional is
predicated upon the proposition that the Constitution allocates the legislative
function entirely to Congress, and that by stating his interpretation or intention not
to enforce certain aspects of legislation, a president violates that allocation and
improperly usurps a portion of the legislative function to the executive. In order to
properly assess this proposition, it necessary to understand the background,
purpose and effect of both signing statements and the separation of powers
principles against which they are to be judged.

- Evolution of Signing Statements as a Political Tool A. Origins and different uses of signing statements.
The United States Constitution assigns to Congress the authority of
passing legislation. The president, as head of the executive branch, is charged
with enforcing legislation once passed. For legislation passed by Congress to
become effective, the president must sign it. Since at least 1830, presidents have
on occasion accompanied their execution of legislation with statements
commenting on or calling into question the validity of one or more provisions of
the legislation, and/or their intent to enforce such provisions. The first
documented presidential signing statement dates back to the Monroe
administration, and since that time approximately 2,200 signing statements have
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been issued, the vast majority of them since the Reagan administration.4 For most
of our history, this practice did not raise concerns about whether it violated the
Constitution or the principle of separation of powers upon which it was based.
However, use of these presidential signing statements increased substantially
during the Reagan administration, and continued to be used liberally by Presidents
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. President George W. Bush has elevated the
use of the signing statements to a completely new level, challenging over 1,000
statutes in 118 laws during his first seven years, far more than any of his
predecessors.5
Not all signing statements are controversial; it depends on the context and
intent of their use. The types of signing statements that have fallen under scrutiny
are those that challenge the constitutionality of signed bills and arguably
circumvent the presentment clause of the Constitution. Signing statements have
been organized into three different categories by political scientist Christopher
Kelley and former Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger: constitutional
signing statements, political signing statements and rhetorical signing statements.
Each type of signing statement has a different effect on the bill to which it is
attached. While these three types of signing statements have different policy
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Christopher S. Kelley “The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing
Statement” Diss. Miami Univ., 2003. 4 Nov. 2007 <http://www.ohiolink.edu/
etd/s end-pdf.cgi/Kelley%20Christopher%20S .pdf?miami1057716977>.
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T.J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional
Implications (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007) 9-12. 16
Dec. 2007 <http://www.coherentbabble.com /signingstatements/CRS/RL336679172007.pdf>.
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effects, none of them have an immediate impact on the legislation to which they
are attached.
Rhetorical signing statements are used to convey the likely effects of a
bill’s adoption on the public and certain constituencies.6 The president plays an
important role in the legislative process, and much of a president’s success
depends upon his ability to get legislation passed consistent with his political
agenda. Thus, it is often important that the president portray himself positively
with respect to legislation that he signs. Rhetorical signing statements have
become a part of presidential strategy to relate to the public. As a national
figurehead, the president is often held responsible by the public for many of the
nation’s problems. Presidents have tried to mitigate this association by using
political tools such as signing statements to positively affect public opinion. This
use of signing statements has no real negative consequences, and was the most
common use of signing statements before the 1980s.
Prior to the Reagan administration, signing statements were commonly
used as a political device by the president. Political signing statements are used to
direct officers in the executive branch on how to interpret and administer a law
signed by the president.7 This function relates to the fact that the executive
branch has grown dramatically over time, making it increasingly difficult for a
president to ensure that his constituents in the executive branch are all ‘on the

6

Walter Dellinger, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements
(United States: Department of Justice, 3 Nov. 1993) 12 Oct. 2007
<http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm>.
7

Ibid.
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same page’ when it comes to executing legislation. As James Pfiffner, an expert
on the American presidency, has observed:

In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt had only a few aides to
help him draft and shepherd into law his famous
‘100 days’ legislative agenda. In 2007, there were
more than 400 people in the White House Office,
1,850 in the Executive Office of the President
(which includes the White House Office), with a
total of almost 5,000 serving the president and the
White House more broadly. In the 1930s, there
were fewer than 150 presidential appointees to
manage the executive branch. In 2007, there were
more than 600 (plus 3,000 more political
appointees). In the 1930s and 1940s, the aides to
the president were most often generalists. In the
1990s, the presidency comprised a plethora of
complex bureaucracies filled with specialist.8

In this context, signing statements are useful tools for organizing a large and
complex institution.
Third, signing statements have been used by the president to assert his
opinion that certain sections of a bill being signed are unconstitutional.9 Use of
such ‘constitutional signing statements’ is a controversial practice because of the
ambiguity of the language in Article II of the Constitution and due to differing
8

James P. Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency 5th ed. (United States: Thomson
Wadsworth, 2005) Viii.
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Ibid.
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interpretations of the separation of powers principle. Article I, Section 7 – also
known as the presentment clause – provides a structured framework within which
a bill is supposed to become law, and the separate institutions’ role in that
process. Because signing statements are not part of this process (they are in fact
not mentioned in the Constitution at all), it is debatable as to whether or not
constitutional signing statements circumvent the presentment clause – impeding
the legislative process – or if they are a modern tool used by the president to
“faithfully execute” the laws. Historically, this type of signing statement was the
least used. However, the use of constitutional signing statements has increased
exponentially since the Reagan administration.
This paper analyzes both the legal and policy implications of the
constitutional type of presidential signing statements. It assesses the application of
separation of powers principles from how they were envisioned by the
Constitution’s framers, to how they have been applied and interpreted through
history. It then reviews some of the legal and practical barriers to resolving issues
surrounding a particular signing statement, as well as the legislative provisions it
challenges. Finally, it reviews the policy implications of this practice and the
political difficulties it creates. It concludes that signing statements likely do not
violate the constitution, but more importantly, they create political problems that
render them unsupportable as a matter of public policy.

B. The signing statement controversy takes center stage: are they a legitimate
exercise of executive power or an improper usurpation of legislative or judicial
power?

11

The proliferation of constitutional signing statements during the George
W. Bush administration has drawn attention to, and fanned the flames of
controversy around this practice. At first, the issue was limited primarily to legal
and political circles. Beginning with the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the
Department of Justice issued a series of memoranda defending the limited use of
signing statements as an appropriate use of executive power.10 The practice
continued along a similar path through the Clinton and first Bush administrations.
The use of signing statements changed in magnitude and philosophy with
the second Bush administration, which dramatically increased their use in what
many viewed as a frontal assault on the Congress’ legislative prerogative. This
change caught the eyed of Boston Globe columnist Charlie Savage, who
published a series of Pulitzer Prize winning articles which criticized this practice
as an example of an overreaching, “imperialistic” presidency. Savage observed
that:
Legal scholars say the scope and aggression of
Bush’s assertions that he can bypass laws represent
10

See, Steve Calabresi, memorandum for the Attorney General on

Presidential Signing Statements, 23 Aug. 1985. 23 Sept. 2007
<http://www.archives. gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc06089-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf>.
Walter Dellinger, memo to the Department of Justice, The Legal Significance
of Presidential Signing Statements, 3 Nov. 1993. 12 Oct. 2007 <http://ww
w.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm>.
Samuel Alito Jr., memo to the Litigation Strategy Working Group, U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, Washington, DC. 5 Feb. 1986.
14 April 2007 <http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-06089-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf>.
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a concerted effort to expand his power at the
expense of Congress, upsetting the balance between
the branches of government. The Constitution is
clear in assigning to Congress the power to write
laws and to the president a duty “to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.” Bush, however, has
repeatedly declared that he does not need to execute
a law he believes is unconstitutional.
Savage’s articles transformed President Bush’s use of signing statements into a
national issue, and broadened the debate beyond inner political and legal circles to
the public at large. As a result, not only were the views of Congress and the
Executive Branch widely publicized, but many other views were aired. Editors of
major newspapers addressed the issue on their op-ed pages, readers responded,
and articles and papers on the subject appeared across a broad spectrum of
publications.11
- Separation of Powers: A Bedrock Constitutional Principle The basic premise underlying the principle of separation of powers is
easily stated. Forged in the kiln of the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth
century and pounded into shape by the philosophers of the day – such as

11

See, “Veto? Who Needs a Veto?,” Editorial, New York Times 5 May 2006

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/05/opinion/05fril.html?th&emc=th>
“A White House power grab,” Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle 12 June 2006
<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/200 6/06/12/E
DGMSJ BOEJ1.DTL>

“Signing statements an abuse of power,” Editorial, Asbury Park Press 6 June
2006, <http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/art icle?AID=/200660 6/OPINI
ON/606060313/1032>
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Montesquieu – the concept was a cornerstone of the freedom movement whose
goal was to prevent too much power from accumulating in the hands of too few.
To do so, the legitimate powers of the government were to be separated into the
different branches of government, with each providing a check against the others
gaining too much power.
This structure was adopted by the authors of the Constitution as a
foundational principle upon which the structure of our government was to be
anchored. Recently divorced from English rule, the founders were acutely aware
of the dangers of sovereign rule, and were determined not to re-create it in the
form of an overly strong executive. At the same time, however, they recognized
the need for a functional central government with sufficient authority to meet the
young country’s needs. Indeed, there was little disagreement that the Articles of
Confederation, to be replaced by the Constitution, were wholly inadequate on this
score. These competing concerns were advanced, on the one hand, by the
Federalist or Hamiltonian camp that argued for a strong central government and
president, and on the other by the Jeffersonians who did not want a dominant
president—or central, federal government, for that matter-- and advocated for a
decentralized government with as much power as possible residing in the states.
Not surprisingly, these principles figured prominently in the debates
leading up to the creation of the Constitution. In The Federalist No. 51, James
Madison noted that the separation of powers is “essential to the preservation of
liberty.”12 Madison further observed in Federalist No.48 that the different
12

James Madison, Federalist No. 51: “The Structure of the Government Must
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.”
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branches must have control over one another in order to be “separate and
distinct.”13 He very succinctly described how critical separation of powers was to
the young democracy: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands...may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny."14 In the end, the importance of having a strong national figurehead
trumped the fear of putting too much power in the hands of one person. The
critical safeguard against a usurpation of power by the president was the separate
powers entrusted to the judicial and legislative branches, and the system of checks
and balances that resulted.
In the end, all agreed upon a system of government that divided the key
functions of government among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
The debate about how the system worked did not, however, end with the
ratification of the Constitution. Indeed, it is one of the great ironies of our
political history that not even those men who had so carefully crafted our
Constitution around the principle of separation of powers agreed on how that
principle should be applied in practice. Throughout the late eighteenth and early

Independent Journal. 6 February 1788. 17 December 2007 <
http://www.constitution.org/fed/ federa51.htm>
13

James Madison. Federalist No. 48: “These Departments Should Not Be So Far
Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.” New York
Packet. 1 February 1788. 17 December 2007 <
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa48.htm>
14

James Madison. Federalist No. 47: “The Particular Structure of the New
Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.” New York
Packet. 30 January 1788. 9 January 2008 <
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa47.htm>
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nineteenth centuries, this issue was the subject of heated partisan debate between
the Federalists and the Republicans.
Nor was there agreement on how disputes over constitutional
interpretation should be resolved. It is commonly understood today that the
courts are the arbiters of the Constitution. But that was not the case immediately
after the Constitution was ratified. Indeed, it was commonly thought that
constitutional questions were far too fundamental to be entrusted to federal judges
who were not answerable to the people because they were appointed by the
president and had life tenure, and who for the most part were partisan appointees
of the party in power. This issue was put to rest in 1803 by Chief Justice John
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison. The backdrop of Marbury was the
bitter partisan divide following Jefferson’s defeat of Adams in 1800, and the
actions of the lame-duck Federalists in passing the Judiciary Act and packing the
judiciary with last minute Federalist appointments. In addressing these issues,
Marshall determined that while the appointments were consistent with the
Judiciary Act, the Judiciary Act itself contravened the Constitution, and therefore
could not be enforced. In one fell swoop, Marshall declared the supremacy of the
Constitution over any other law or act, and stated that it was the role of the
judiciary alone to interpret the Constitution and determine when it was being
infringed. These propositions, so obvious today, were not at all obvious in the
years following the Constitution’s birth.
While many disagreed with Marbury, its essential rulings never came
under serious threat. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning separation

16
of powers confirmed and strengthened the judiciary’s role as the final arbiter of
disputes over constitutional meaning. As discussed below, however, many argue
that there remains an important political role in constitutional construction, thus
perpetuating (at a reduced level) the original debate.

III
SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE LAW:

17
Signing Statements Do Not
Violate The Constitution

Following the Savage articles, the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
decided to enter the debate. While it is the largest and most influential national
organization of attorneys, the ABA has no formal, official role in resolving
constitutional issues. Nonetheless, its views on important legal and constitutional
issues are quite influential. For example, the ABA historically rates nominees to
the Supreme Court and other important legal positions in terms of their
qualifications, capabilities and experience.
In April of 2006, then ABA President Michael Greco established a nonpartisan task force comprised of judges, law professors and attorneys to study the
issue and offer its conclusions and recommendations. The Task Force issued its
report in August 2006, in which it unanimously and unequivocally concluded that
signing statements were unconstitutional. Specifically, they voted to
Oppose, as contrary to the rule of law and our
constitutional system of separation of powers, a
President’s issuance of signing statements to claim
the authority or state the intention to disregard or
decline to enforce all or part of a law he has signed,
or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent
with the clear intent of Congress.15

15

“American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and

the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Report with Recommendations,” 5 (2006),
<http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_
statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf>
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Based upon this conclusion, the Task Force passed several resolutions, including
resolutions urging:

•

The President, if he believes that any

provision of a bill pending before Congress would
be unconstitutional if enacted to communicate such
concerns to Congress prior to passage;
•

The President to confine any signing

statements to his views regarding the meaning,
purpose and significance of bills presented by
Congress, and that if he believes that all or part of a
bill is unconstitutional, to veto the bill in
accordance with Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of
the United States, which directs him to approve or
disapprove each bill in its entirety;
•

Congress to enact legislation requiring the

President promptly to submit to Congress an
official copy of all signing statements he issues, and
in any instance in which he claims the authority, or
states the intention, to disregard or decline to
enforce all or part of a law he has signed, or to
interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with
the clear intent of Congress, to submit to Congress
a report setting forth in full the reasons and legal
basis for the statement; and further requiring that
all such submissions be available in a publicly
accessible database; and
•

Congress to enact legislation enabling the

President, Congress, or other entities or
individuals, to seek judicial review, to the extent

19
constitutionally permissible, in any instance in
which the President claims the authority, or states
the intention, to disregard or decline to enforce all
or part of a law he has signed, or interprets such a
law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of
Congress, and urges Congress and the President to
support a judicial resolution of the President’s
claim or intention.16

Each of these recommendations was intended to obviate the political and legal
tensions created by signing statements. However, they spring from a faulty
premise: that a president unconstitutionally usurps legislative authority from the
legislative branch when he asserts his belief that aspects of the legislation are
unconstitutional, and declares his intention not to enforce aspects of such
legislation. In fact, signing statements do not, in and of themselves, violate the
Constitution, and to hold otherwise violates longstanding principles of
constitutional interpretation, with potentially serious consequences. There are
four bases for this conclusion, each of which is addressed, in turn, below.
1. Signing statements do not exceed the President’s constitutional authority,
or usurp authority delegated to the other two branches.
Any argument that an action by one of the three branches of government
violates the separation of powers must, by definition, be based upon a showing
that the action exceeds the express delegation of authority under the Constitution

16

Ibid.
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and/or encroaches on the authority delegated to one of the other branches.
Signing statements do neither.
In arguing that signing statements exceed the President’s designated
authority, the Task Force first pointed to the limited role of the President in the
legislative process. Under Article I, § 7, he must either sign or veto a bill that is
passed by Congress and submitted to him under the Presentment Clause. The
Task Force then argued that the president exceeds his authority when he signs a
bill but indicates in a signing statement his position that one or more aspects of
the bill are unconstitutional, or that he interprets one or more provisions
differently than Congress. Finally, the Task Force concluded that by so doing, the
president violates his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law.17
These arguments ring hollow. As a threshold matter, it is broadly
accepted that while the Constitution was designed around the separation of
powers principle, that separation is not, and was never intended to be, absolute
and complete. One constitutional scholar has described the relationship as more of
a ‘mingling’ than a separation:
Although it is a misnomer as a matter of intellectual
history, “separation of powers” is often used as a
shorthand phrase for the complex system of checks
and balances created by the Constitution—checks
and balances that in fact mingle the different types
of governmental power. To be sure, the
Constitution provides that Congress is given “[a]ll
the legislative powers herein granted,” that “the

17
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Executive power” is vested in the President, and
that “the Judicial Power of the United States” is
vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts
created by Congress. But the Constitution does not
itself define “legislative,” “executive,” or
“judicial” powers, and the functions assigned to
each branch belie any suggestion that the
Constitution establishes a strict separation.18

With respect to the legislative power, while primary responsibility for legislation
falls to Congress, it is universally recognized that the president does have a
constitutional role in legislation. That role begins, at a minimum, with the power
to sign or veto legislation under the Presentment Clause, and many view it as
extending into a much broader range of legislative roles. One commentator
identifies no fewer than fifteen areas in which the Constitution arguably confers
legislative authority on the President. 19 However enumerated, it is clear that the
President has some role in legislation, and therefore the premise that signing
statements are unconstitutional because they involve legislation cannot withstand
scrutiny.
Moreover, the argument that the President must either veto a bill in its
entirety or sign it and then execute each and every portion of it with equal rigor is
unpersuasive. The conditions under which the President should either sign or veto

18

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Third ed. Vol. 1. (New York:
West Publishing Company, 1999) 137.
19

Theodore Olson, “Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes,
Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Authority,”
Washington University Law Quarterly (1990).
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a bill are not defined in the Constitution. Nowhere does it say or suggest that he
must veto a bill he believes presents constitutional issues, or that by signing a bill
he waives such concerns. And the view that a president must enforce a statutory
provision he believes to be unconstitutional is difficult to justify as a
constitutional mandate. But these arguments necessarily underlie the Task Force’s
position, which would eliminate a president’s ability to reserve his constitutional
concerns for a later time, and require him to veto an entire bill if he had potential
concerns about some aspect of the bill. Not only is this mandate nowhere to be
found in the Constitution, but it runs directly counter to the president’s obligation
to uphold the Constitution. It could also very well lead to an unworkable
legislative process, as the President would feel compelled to veto bills with much
greater frequency to protect his position, even if it is highly unlikely that his
concerns will come to pass for any single piece of legislation. This would be
particularly unworkable in the realities of modern legislation, which are often in
the form of omnibus bills containing thousands of provisions.
Similarly, the President’s expressed concerns over the constitutionality of
a provision, and a stated intention to interpret it in a certain way and/or not to
execute it under certain circumstances, create only the possibility of a conflict in
the future. Indeed, in comparison to the number of signing statements issued,
only a small portion have actually resulted in a dispute. A stated difference of
opinion that may, at some future time and under circumstances that may or may
not come to pass, lead to a refusal by the president to execute the law as intended
by Congress simply is not a violation of separation of powers.
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Finally, signing statements do not usurp the legislative function from
Congress. They do not interfere with the ability of Congress to pass legislation
and present it to the president, or to override his veto if he should exercise it.
While it is understandable that Congress does not like the practice and the
president’s broad use of it, in fact it has had minimal impact in the execution of its
legislation by the president. It is well recognized that each branch has a
legitimate interest in protecting its authority and arguing for an expanded
interpretation of its authority relative to the other branches. The branches are
unlikely to ever reach agreement on their respective powers. To require that all
such disputes be resolved finally through the veto process would likely bring the
legislative process to a standstill. And while it is true that once the president has
acted it may be difficult to resolve the dispute, as discussed below an actual
controversy can be resolved in the courts.
2. Signing statements have no legal effect.
Signing statements are not law, and do not embody any action by the
president at the time they are made. To the extent they are an effort to influence
judicial construction of statutes, they have been woefully unsuccessful. In
Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006), the Court held that presidential signing statements
containing the president’s proposed interpretation of a statute are virtually
irrelevant when it comes to determining the intent behind a statute.20
It is difficult to argue that an action by one of the branches that has no
effect at the time it was taken somehow infringes upon the authority of one of the
20

Hamdan V. Rumsfeld. No. 05-184. Supreme Court of the United States. 29
June 2006. 9 Jan. 2008 <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05184.pdf>.

24
other branches. If and when the president decides to not enforce a statutory
provision, or to apply it in a manner contrary to Congress’ intent, then—and only
then—is there a basis for challenge.
3. Signing statements are not justiciable at the time they are issued.
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the judiciary to decide
only actual “cases or controversies.” This provision requires that someone
seeking judicial review of government action must be able to show that they have
suffered some form of concrete harm. Closely related to the ‘case or controversy’
requirement are other requirements that relate to whether or not an issue is
capable of being adjudicated. They include standing, requiring that the party
bringing suit personally be in a position to bring suit; ripeness, requiring that the
issue to be adjudicated has actually occurred; and mootness, requiring that a
controversy still be alive at the time of adjudication. Together, these principles
embody the concept of justiciability.
The Supreme Court addressed the justiciability issue in the context of
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches in Raines v.
Byrd. After voting against the Line Item Veto Act giving the President the power
to selectively veto specific portions of a spending bill, several members of
Congress filed suit against members of the executive branch charged with
enforcing the Act. They claimed that granting the President the ability to veto
specific portions of a bill, rather that the entire bill as provided in the Constitution,
diluted their legislative authority under Article I. The Supreme Court dismissed
their case, ruling that the members had failed to identify the sort of particularized,
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concrete harm to themselves necessary to present a ‘case or controversy’ as
required by Article III.
The same barrier prevents Congress from challenging signing statements
in the courts. The ABA Task Force, and others critical of signing statements,
point to this justiciability problem in support of their argument that signing
statements violate separation of powers principles. But this is a non-sequitor. The
fact that Congress cannot challenge signing statements under Article III has
nothing to do with whether they encroach upon Congress’ Article I authority.
- Final Statement on Constitutionality Numerous complex legal arguments can be made for or against the
constitutionality of signing statements. Because the focus of this paper is
primarily on the policy rather than the legality of signing statements, the
arguments above assume that the balance of all the legal debates suggest signing
statements are legitimate under the Constitution. Under this condition, the next
section of this paper will examine how signing statements are an example of a bad
policy despite being constitutional.

26

PART II
Presidential Signing Statements as Policy
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THE MODERN USE OF SIGNING STATEMENTS
The Utilization of Signing Statements to Expand Presidential Power

IV
The conclusion that the Bush administration’s broad use of signing
statements is not unconstitutional when made does not end the controversy that
surrounds them. They still arguably represent a unilateral power grab by the
executive branch at the expense of Congress, as Savage characterizes them in his
articles.21 They continue to foster resentment in Congress and a seriously reduced
willingness to work cooperatively with the President. And while the ABA
overreached in its conclusion with respect to the constitutionality of signing
statements, its analysis, conclusions and recommendations reflect a widespread
belief that the administration’s actions are inappropriate. In short, while signing
statements may not violate the letter of the Constitution and the separation of
powers principles upon which it was built, there remains a strong argument that
they violate the spirit of these principles, and have a corrosive effect on the
delicate balance that the drafters so carefully crafted.
A. Political Construction of the Constitution and Resulting Policy.
From the very moment the Constitution was ratified, debates have raged
over the respective authority, and limits thereon, of the three branches. This is
particularly true as between the executive and legislative branches, reflecting a
continuation of the original constitutional debate over the need for a strong
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executive, contrasted with the importance of a strong legislative body to keep the
executive in check. Indeed, it has become an accepted, and expected, role of each
branch to take an expansive view of its authority, and defend that view as against
the other branches. In his book Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning, Keith B. Whittington examines this dynamic not as a
marginal product of partisan politics, but rather as an integral component of
constitutional construction and the evolution thereof. Whittington posits that the
traditional analysis of constitutional construction in strictly legal terms misses a
significant aspect of how our understanding of the Constitution has, and should
be, developed. He asserts:
The bridge from Constitutionalism to judicial
supremacy has been built on the contention that the
courts are preeminently the American “forum of
principle,” whereas the non-judicial arenas are
characterized by a politics of power driven by
conflicting interests and assertions of will.
Unfortunately, that bridge depended more on
caricatures drawn by academic lawyers than on the
examination of historical political experience. The
role of the Court will have to be situated within a
context of competing claims to constitutional
authority and alternative visions of appropriate
constitutional meaning.22

The principal “non-judicial arenas” to which Whittington refers are the political
arenas in which skirmishes routinely take place over the authority, and limitations
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thereon, of the executive and legislative branches, respectively. Fueled by
“political will” and advanced by “explicit advocates,” these skirmishes “display
none of the objectivity valued in the jurisprudential model” of constitutional
construction.23
Whittingon’s view that political constitutional construction is desirable
and necessary is undoubtedly at odds with a ‘strict constructionist’ view of
constitutional interpretation, which would not only limit construction to the
judiciary, but strictly limit the judiciary’s role and flexibility. Regardless of
whether political construction should occur, however, it no doubt does. And the
battle over signing statements provides a concrete example of “[a]mbitious
political actors” construing the constitution “in order to find support for their own
political interests and [constructing] a vision of constitutional meaning that
enshrines their own values and interests.” 24
B. The Evolution of Signing Statements as Policy – From Reagan to George
W. Bush.
In order to properly evaluate signing statements as acts of political
construction, it is necessary to understand the policy goals and implications that
they entail, and to trace the development of the policy and the underlying context.
As discussed above, signing statements were used only sporadically prior to the
1980’s. Beginning with the Reagan administration and continuing to the present,
presidents have increasingly used signing statements in a planned, strategic
manner. This change was not accidental. It arose out of conflicts between the
23
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executive and legislative branches over legislative policy, which prompted
attorneys and policymakers in the executive branch to develop constitutional
theories supporting use of signing statements as a tool against Congress. A
review of the analyses underlying these theories and how they evolved over time
provides some insight into the development and use of signing statements as
policy, and how each administration intended to use signing statements to
enhance presidential power.
An analytical framework within which to evaluate this policy development
is also useful. Presidents have used different forms of executive power to
influence legislation. Academic studies examining the modern presidency have
focused on the different means by which presidents use their power to push their
personal agendas through the legislative branch. The three principal theories that
relate to how presidents (since Reagan) have issued signing statements as policy
are: the power to persuade Congress; appealing to the electorate in order to gain
support; and unilateral presidential action.25
After World War II the president became more widely recognized as the
“chief legislator” due to the important role held in the legislative process.26 From
this idea of a legislative presidency Neustadt, Kernell and Howell have identified
three commonly accepted forms effective presidential leadership. In 1960,
Neustadt wrote a study on presidential power that concluded “presidential power
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is the power to persuade.”27 Neustadt’s conception of presidential power became
an influential study of the presidency. Kernell’s theory of going public to gain
support and Howell’s unilateral action model are both derived from Neustadt’s
study of presidential power. These different forms of presidential power have
branched off from Neustadt’s original conception to test the water of expansive
presidential powers. Likewise, they have been applied to signing statements in an
attempt to utilize their full potential as a form of persuasion.
While the president holds many formal and informal powers to influence
legislation, signing statements have encompassed the three listed above.
Understanding the use of signing statements in terms of these theories will
demonstrate how the signing statement, as a policy, has fundamentally changed in
its general purpose and implementation from its origins in the Reagan
administration to the presidency of George W. Bush. Indeed, the transformation
of the signing statement by the Bush administration into a broad-based, unilateral
effort to co-opt power to the president fundamentally changed the debate around
this issue.
-Ronald ReaganSteven Calabresi and John Harrison, two young attorneys in the Office of
Legal Counsel under President Reagan, are generally credited as the first people
to propose the strategic use of signing statements as a policy tool for increasing
executive power. According to Calabresi and Harrison, judges notoriously abused
legislative history when interpreting laws and ignored the stance of the president
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when making their decisions.28 On August 23, 1985, the two young lawyers sent
a memorandum to Attorney General Ed Meese, suggesting that signing statements
can be used to put the president’s interpretation of a law on record and, in effect,
take away Congress’ monopoly over legislative interpretation.29 As a direct result
of this memorandum, Attorney General Meese arranged for the West Publishing
Company – the company that publishes official legislative history – to publish
presidential signing statements along with legislative history.30 Subsequent
memoranda circulated through the Department of Justice suggested that the
signing statement was a severely underutilized tool for the president to counteract
Congress’ legislative supremacy.
The ideology behind this approach was that the very existence of signing
statements would give the administration leverage over Congress in legislative
matters and would, in turn, make Congress more willing to compromise with the
president. Another behind-the-scenes framer of this new approach to signing
statements was then Assistant Attorney General Ralph Tarr. Tarr insisted on
using signing statements to influence how agencies interpret statutes, to inform
Congress of a problematic or unconstitutional provision and to make the
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executive’s position available to judges.31 These internal memoranda suggest that
the original intent of signing statements as policy was to keep pace with an
overbearing Congress. If that is actually the case then it becomes important to
quickly analyze the relationship between Congress and the Reagan administration.
Reagan began his presidential career with relative success in passing his
agenda though Congress. He was able to successfully pass his budget priorities in
1981, but found it difficult get most of his agenda through Congress after that,
especially in his second term.32 Prior to the 1983 Supreme Court case INS v.
Chadha, Congress used legislative vetoes – an act by Congress that removed
powers granted to the executive branch – to broaden its power by having control
over executive agencies. And, even after the Supreme Court found legislative
vetoes to be unconstitutional, Congress frequently acted with hostility toward the
administration instead of cooperating in order to pass legislation. Reagan
subsequently set up meetings with congressmen and negotiated compromises and
agreements in order to move his agenda forward.33 Signing statements emerged
from Reagan’s legal department as a tool for the president to coerce cooperation
from legislators, pass his agenda and to assert the president’s authority as chief
ruler of the executive branch.
With these intentions in mind, the signing statement under Reagan
represents a form of presidential power envisioned by Richard Neustadt.
31
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Neustadt is an expert on the American Presidency, has been a presidential advisor
for three decades, and is a professor in the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. Neustadt submits that presidents use their inherent skill sets
to influence legislation by bargaining with Congress. He recognizes Reagan’s
skills as a likable and effective communicator that enabled him to consistently
come off in a positive light in the public and the media, skills that produced
approval ratings consistently around 65 percent for much of his tenure.34
Reagan’s use of signing statements, however, did not utilize this skill set; rather,
they were primarily used as leverage against Congress –a form of bargaining –
and kept out of the media. Viewed through Neustadt’s theory of presidential
power, the Reagan administration’s approach used signing statements as a way to
stake their territory in the executive branch and to influence legislation through
the power of persuasion. According to William Howell, “Neustadt’s original
formulation of presidential power remains conventional wisdom -- presidents are
powerful to the extent that they can drive their legislative agendas through
Congress, bargain with bureaucrats, and breed loyalty within their
administrations.”35 Facing repeated opposition and increased power in Congress,
the new and increased use of signing statements by the Reagan administration can
be seen as a formal means of the president asserting his power of persuasion in
order to keep up with a legislative branch that controlled the lawmaking process.
34
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-George H. W. Bush (Bush I)The first Bush administration followed a similar strategy to the Reagan
administration regarding signing statements, with the primary objective being to
increase his influence over legislation using the power of persuasion. However,
the Justice Department had become much more organized addressing signing
statements since Calabresi and Harrison’s memorandum in 1985, and the process
of issuing signing statements became much more formulaic. This re-organization
can be traced to another executive branch memorandum, this one authored by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General under President Reagan, Samuel Alito, and
sent to the Litigation Strategy Working Group. Alito’s memorandum set forth a
plan to slowly implement the use of signing statements as a regular policy, and
forewarned of the possible oppositions this policy faced. Alito took the view that
because the president inherently plays a major role in the passage and execution
of legislation, the interpretation of the president should be as important and hold
as much weight as legislative history.
Alito’s proposal strategically laid out how the administration should go
about issuing signing statements to achieve the goal of expanding presidential
influence over the legislative process. Alito’s memorandum lists five possible
obstacles to the enhanced use of signing statements: (1) the limited amount of
resources available; (2) the president only has ten days to issue a signing
statement after receiving a bill from Congress; (3) Congress will most likely have
a negative reaction to the use of signing statements; (4) the possibility of
reluctance by executive departments and agencies; and (5) the theoretical issues
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(legal concerns) regarding the president’s role in the legislative process.36
Following is Alito’s proposal to most effectively deal with these obstacles:
C. A Proposal.
In view of the concerns noted above, I would make
the following recommendation.

- As an introductory step, the Department should
seek to have interpretive signing statements issued
for a reasonable number of bills that fall within
its own field of responsibility. By concentrating at
first on a small number of bills, we can begin
without a commitment of resources that would
necessitate major changes in staffing. And by
concentrating on bills within our own field of
responsibility and concern, we can begin without
depending upon the cooperation of other
departments and agencies, which may be
skeptical at first. If our project is successful,
cooperation may be more readily available.

- For use in this pilot project, we should try to
identify bills that (a) are reasonably likely to pass,
(b) are of some importance, and (c) are likely
to present suitable problems of interpretation.

- Again, as an introductory step, our
interpretive statements should be of moderate size
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and scope. Only relatively important questions
should be addressed. We should concentrate on
points of true ambiguity, rather than issuing
interpretations that may seem to conflict with those
of Congress. The first step will be to convince the
courts that Presidential signing statements are
valuable interpretive tools.
- It would also be very helpful, as pointed out in
Steve Calabresi's memorandum of January 27,
1986, to include in each signing statement a
section spelling out the grant of authority to the
federal government on which the statute rests.

- The most important step will be approval of this
project by the President. Obviously there can be no
project unless the President wishes to sign
interpretive statements of the type we envision. For
the purpose of presenting this issue to the President,
it may be helpful if we draft a sample of a newstyle signing statement either for a bill that is now
pending before Congress or one that was recently
enacted. Also, as a first step, the proposal should be
discussed with White House counsel.

- The Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental
Affairs seems the logical unit within the Department
to coordinate our efforts. In particular, OLIA
should be able to identify appropriate bills as they
proceed through Congress. The actual selection
of the bills may then be done, in cooperation with
OLIA, by this Group as a whole, a subgroup, or
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some other body. Once appropriate bills have been
chosen, components of the Department with
expertise regarding the particular bills
selected should be asked for their views. For
example, OLC should be consulted, as it now is,
when constitutional questions are raised. OLIA
should assemble and coordinate the responses of
the various units.

- Because of the time problems previously noted, the
drafting of our pilot signing statements should
begin well before final passage of the bills.
Moreover, if Presidential signing statements are
ever to achieve much importance, I think it will be
necessary to escape from the requirement of having
to complete our work prior to the signing of the bill.
Accordingly, after the first few efforts, the President
could merely state when signing the bill that
his signing is based on an /*/0-63. Bt the pressure
to complete a formal statement for public release
would be relieved. This procedure would mirror the
procedure followed by congressional committees,
which vote out proposed legislation long before the
committee report is issued.

- The Department should continue and should
intensify its internal consideration of the theoretical
problems posed by the proposed expanded role for
Presidential signing statements. Once a few
signing statements of this new type have been
issued, discussion in legal journals may be,
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stimulated and should be encouraged.37

Thus, Alito was cognizant of both the potential to expand presidential power
through signing statements, and the potential pitfalls that this strategy could
entail. The in-depth strategizing that went into this effort exemplifies the
complexity and controversy surrounding such a policy, and the obstacles that
Alito identifies are partially what limit signing statements from being effective
policy. The underlying point is that Samuel Alito’s proposition opened the door
for the expansion of signing statements but it did so on some precarious grounds.
President George H. W. Bush’s administration took the stance that the
presidency had been losing much of the power that was originally intended by the
framers because of increasing congressional dominance in the legislative process.
Bush’s attorney general, Richard Thornburgh, argued to the Federalist Society in
1990 that the president did not have as much power in the legislative process as
he used to. In his speech Thornburgh claimed:
Today’s legislative process has rendered the
presidential veto a less effective check on
congressional encroachments than was envisioned
two centuries ago…It is often very difficult for the
President to veto legislation that contains
sometimes blatantly unconstitutional provisions.
For example, Congress has become fond of
inserting substantive provisions in appropriations
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bills. This is what they call making the provision
veto-proof.38

This statement illustrates the sentiment held by the White House at the time that
Congress had the upper hand in lawmaking by using legislative loopholes. It is
because of this continued struggle for power between Congress and the executive
branch that the first Bush administration used Alito’s strategy as a foundation for
their use of signing statements.
While still using the signing statement as a form of persuasion (as
envisioned by Neustadt) against Congress, the first Bush administration began
expanding its use of signing statements and became much more strategically
organized in issuing them. This resulted in the first Bush administration utilizing
signing statements more than the Reagan administration – challenging 232
sections of bills – but not significantly changing the intended purpose of the
signing statement as a form of presidential policy.
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of signing statements during the
Reagan and first Bush administration because there is no empirical evidence
available describing how signing statements affected lawmakers. It can be
assumed that they were not very effective because there are very few writings
from that time on signing statements and no references to them in court decisions.
The ineffectiveness of signing statements as a form of persuasion may be why the
Clinton administration used a different strategy in implementing them.
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-ClintonPresident Clinton’s use of signing statements demonstrates that their use
transcends party lines. The signing statement is an instrument used in the
institutional power struggle between the executive and legislative branches; it can
and has been used by presidents of each party. The extent to which partisan
politics play a role in signing statements is apparent when ideological polarization
exists between the President and Congress, restricting the ability of the president
to pass his policy agenda through the legislature. This was the case for President
Clinton through most of his tenure as president. Dealing with a Republican led
Congress through most of his two terms, President Clinton resorted to signing
statements in order to set his agenda against a hostile Congress. 39
Clinton, however, followed a slightly different approach than presidents
Reagan and Bush. While the first Bush administration primarily meant for the
signing statements to be seen by Congress and courts, President Clinton also
wanted the public to be made aware of his stances on legislation through signing
statements. According to a letter from Walter Dellinger, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel under President Clinton:

If the President may properly decline to enforce a
law, at least when it unconstitutionally encroaches
on his powers, then it arguably follows that he may
properly announce to Congress and to the public
that he will not enforce a provision of an enactment
39
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he is signing. If so, then a signing statement that
challenges what the President determines to be an
unconstitutional encroachment on his power, or
that announces the President's unwillingness to
enforce (or willingness to litigate) such a provision,
can be a valid and reasonable exercise of
40

Presidential authority.

Thus, the Clinton administration used signing statements not only as a form of
persuasion, but also to gain support from the public. This represents a slightly
different approach to achieving the same end: passing the presidential agenda
through Congress. The President, being the solitary nationally elected official,
often faces public scrutiny when he cannot make changes or pass laws promised
in his campaign. When it is others (i.e. Congress) who are holding back such
agendas, the President can go directly to the public in an attempt to gain support
against the actor(s) blocking the presidential agenda.
Samuel Kernell, a professor of political science at the University of
California, San Diego, has termed this new presidential strategy as “going
public.” When used under Neustadt’s model, signing statements (at least as
originally viewed in the Reagan Justice Department) would be used as leverage,
but would still promote bargaining and some form of cooperation. According to
Kernell, going public “violates” bargaining by circumventing exchanges between
the two branches. However, Kernell believes that practiced in an appropriate
manner, going public can displace bargaining. Another major difference between
40
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going public and the power of persuasion is that going public is much more
combative.41 Instead of bi-lateral bargaining to reach an agreement, going public
involves bringing the public in as a third party to the process, implicitly
threatening members of Congress with electoral consequences if they do not
cooperate.
By going public with signing statements, the Clinton administration was
exploring a different manner in which signing statements could be used to the
president’s advantage, in an effort to render them a more effective tool of
persuasion than they were under Bush and Reagan. A valid question to ask here
is: if signing statements were made public by Clinton over a decade ago, why was
there little, if any, public controversy about them at the time? The answer to this
question correlates with the same reasons that Kernell’s strategy proved
ineffective with signing statements. First, the Clinton administration challenged
only 140 sections of law, 92 fewer than the first Bush administration.42 If the
number of challenges had continued on an upward trend, there may have been
more of a public concern, but the declining trend diminished the thought of any
real threat.
Second, the Clinton administration was inconsistent and never fully
expanded the use of signing statements to the level foreseen by Alito. For
example, after attaching a signing statement to a bill that would remove all those
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testing positive for HIV from the military, Dellinger and White House Counsel
Jack Quinn told reporters that it was the position of the administration that the
president was forced to execute the law as written unless the Supreme Court
intervened and said otherwise.43 By going public here, the administration avoided
vetoing a bill, but let the public know at the same time that it disagreed with some
provisions of the bill. Its position could possibly mobilize constituents who
disagree with the bill to write their congressmen, or a person affected by the bill
could take the government to court. The Clinton administration saw that these
possibilities alone might make some legislators change their mind and could assist
in passing the president’s agenda. But due to the lack of consistency by the
president’s employment of signing statements there was not a strong public
reaction.44 And due to the position of the Clinton administration that signing
statements held no standing unless a Supreme Court Justice rules on them, there
was no concern that the president would be acting unilaterally outside of the
system of checks and balances.
Third, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 granted Clinton the power to veto
specific lines of certain bills passed through Congress. With this power, Clinton
had little need to use signing statements as line-item vetoes – one of the largest
criticisms of the practice. In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of the
line-item veto was unconstitutional in the case Clinton v. City of New York. This
decision may have reinforced the idea in the public’s mind that the Court was
keeping tabs on the expansion of presidential powers.
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Finally, Kernell acknowledges that for numerous reasons, going public is
not always effective.45 Going public with signing statements as a policy to
advance the president’s agenda was ineffective for many of those same reasons.
At the time, the signing statement was a little known political tool in which the
public had very little interest. On top of that, Clinton never touched on the issue
of signing statements in a national address, suggesting that while the goal of the
Clinton administration was to go public with signing statements, it was not
prepared to make it a major issue. The lack of interest and the minimal media
coverage along with the other factors made the use of signing statements used by
Clinton relatively ineffective and, in turn, unimportant to the public.
While Clinton wanted signing statements to gain public support for his
agenda, his attempts to do so were ultimately futile. The ineffectiveness of the
signing statement under Kernell’s theory of going public makes it a bad policy
because it ultimately has little to no impact on legislation. In trying to make the
idea of the signing statement palatable to the public, it lost its leverage as a
bargaining chip.
-George W. Bush (Bush II)The use of signing statements by President George W. Bush became
controversial for two main reasons. One reason was the dramatic increase in the
sheer number of signing statements. In his first six years in office, President Bush
challenged more than 800 statutory provisions in his signing statements; all
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previous presidents combined issued fewer than 600 such challenges.46 Along
with the inordinate number of signing statements issued by President Bush, he
issued an unusually low number of vetoes. Seven years into office, President
Bush had vetoed only two bills presented to him by Congress. Even the prior
three presidents who used constitutional signing statements continued to use their
veto power; Clinton vetoed 37 bills during his tenure, George H.W. Bush vetoed
44 and Reagan vetoed 78 over his two terms.47 This downward trend in the
utilization of presidential veto power tends to support Thornburgh’s position that
the veto had lost much of its power, and administrations were searching for other
avenues to exert the office’s power (signing statements being one of the major
policies). Combined, the lack of vetoes and overexpansion of constitutional
signing statements raised a red flag.
The second reason signing statements became more of a concern in the
second Bush administration is that they were implemented as a unilateral
presidential action. Using the signing statement to go public or as a form of
persuasion were very informal ways of bargaining with Congress. However,
unilateral actions by the president come off as much more finite and aggressive.
William Howell, a professor of public policy at the Harris School at the
University of Chicago, points out that one of the most effective ways presidents
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go beyond being merely a veto player is to act unilaterally in making policy.48
Howell’s book, Power Without Persuasion, focuses on the presidential strategy of
acting unilaterally to create policy and push an agenda forward. The major
difference between this strategy and the other two is that instead of trying to
influence the legislative process, unilateral action attempts to circumvent it.49 The
extent to which unilateral action will be effective depends upon the institutional
constraints placed upon the executive branch by Congress and the judiciary.50 In
the case of Bush’s signing statements, the constraints were fairly restrictive when
the president’s policy became clearer. For example, none of Bush’s signing
statements have held weight in a court decision. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court specifically rejected the principles established in one of Bush’s signing
statements. Also, in January of 2007, the House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary and the Senate Judiciary Committee both held hearings examining
the use of signing statements under President George W. Bush. These hearings
along with Senator Arlen Specter’s (R –PA) proposal – embodied in The
Presidential Signing Statement Act of 2006 – to limit the power of signing
statements illustrate the backlash Bush’s use of signing statements have caused in
Congress.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michelle E. Boardman’s testimony
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary provides insight into the Bush
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administration’s intentions when issuing signing statements. Boardman argued in
the hearing that signing statements were good for separation of powers because it
created dialogue between the branches.51 The resulting dialog, however, focused
on signing statements as unilateral actions and not on the substantive issues
surrounding the bills to which the signing statements were attached. If signing
statements actually initiated discussions on bills between the President and
Congress then the signing statements would be effectively fulfilling part their
original purpose. However, the unilateral use of signing statements under Bush
has incited more conflict between the branches than cooperation and bargaining.
In response to the Bush II administration citing his memorandum to
defend their use of signing statements, former Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger wrote an Op-Ed piece to the New York Time explaining why the Bush
administration’s use of signing statements have been misguided. Dellinger first
points out that the American Bar Association has misdiagnosed signing
statements as being the problem when the real problem is the president’s
constitutional interpretations.52 This was an issue that was never a problem when
signing statements were used as a form of persuasion or for going public.
Dellinger had assumed the president is always afforded the ability to refuse to
enforce unconstitutional laws and, according to Dellinger:
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A president’s ability to decline to enforce
unconstitutional laws is an important safeguard of
both separation of powers and individual liberty…If
a president may decline to execute an
unconstitutional law enacted before he assumed
office, he should retain that right in the case of an
unconstitutional provision of a bill he signs himself.
Of course, if presented with a bill that is entirely
unconstitutional, the proper response is a veto.53

Under these assumptions, the sole purpose of a signing statement is to actually
place a check on Congressional actions. It has been more difficult in the modern
presidency to use the veto as the lone check on bills passed through Congress,
especially with the amount of multiprovision and omnibus legislation – the
signing statement offers a “valuable and lawful alternative” to vetoing one of
these bills.54 From this, Dellinger concludes that the real risk is not the signing
statement but the unilateral authority Bush assumes from the use of signing
statements. Bush clearly ignores Dellinger’s warnings that the president should
presume most laws are legitimate and exercise great deference to Congress’
positions on a provision’s constitutionality. When these warnings are strictly
heeded, the risk that a president will “assert a dubious claim of unconstitutionality
in order to sidestep a law he simply doesn’t like” will likely go way down.55
Dellinger’s letter to the New York Times illustrates how the strategic
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implementation of a policy can clearly change the original intention behind it.
The Bush II administration’s decision to issue signing statements as unilateral
actions was ineffective as a policy because it altered the purpose of the original
policy and it created more tension with Congress.
The Bush II administration systematically dove into legislation looking for
any possible section of a bill a signing statement could be attached to – using
minimal deference. They created an assembly line of attorneys whose job it was
to read through legislation and identify any provision that could conceivably limit
presidential power, and thus was a candidate for a signing statement. Before any
signing statement could be presented to the president, it had to go through the
Office of the Vice President – an office that had never before had any
involvement in the process of issuing signing statements.56 Thus, the Bush II
administration’s primary goal of signing statements had shifted from pushing the
presidential agenda forward, to instituting a unitary executive.
The idea of a unitary executive, in short, is to limit the powers of Congress
while endowing the president with absolute control over the executive branch.
This simplified theory along with the types of provisions President Bush
challenged can provide a better understanding of why he used signing statements
the way he did.
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Neil Kinkopf, an Associate Professor of Law at Georgia State University College
of Law, and Peter Shane, the Director of the Project on Law and Democratic
Development at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, compiled a
data set of signing statements under President George W. Bush organized by the
category of objection:

Source: Kinkopf, Neil, and Peter Shane. Index of Presidential Signing Statements:
2001- 2007. American Constitution Society for Law and Policy. Advance, 2007.
12 Mar. 2008 <http://www.acslaw.org/files/Signing%20Statement%20C
hart%20-%20Neil%20Kinkopf %20and%20Peter%20Shane.pdf>.

This table provides 23 objections and highlights five major categories of
objections that were continuously used in signing statements under the second
Bush administration. These five objections were the recommendations clause,
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bicameralism and presentment, unitary executive, presidential authority over
foreign affairs and the executive privilege to withhold information (especially
issues relating to national security and classified information). Issues regarding
the authority of the president as commander-in-chief were also used numerous
times. The categories challenged in these signing statements represent
constitutional issues of presidential power. One of the primary objectives of
signing statements under the three administrations before George W. Bush was to
avoid executing provisions of laws that were unconstitutional. By using signing
statements as a unilateral action, one of his primary objectives was to redefine the
constitutional powers of the president. Asserting constitutional powers through
signing statements is not only unfounded but it makes an already ineffective
policy even less palatable.
In short, the Bush II administration transformed the signing statement
from a surgical instrument used to advance the president’s legislative agenda in
carefully selected areas, to a blunt axe used wherever and whenever possible in
order to expand and re-define presidential power generally. It is clear that by
implementing signing statements as a form of unilateral presidential authority,
President Bush deviated from the original intent of signing statements. It was this
use of signing statements that ignited Charlie Savage’s Pulitzer Prize winning
articles on signing statements and raised controversy over the practice.
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V
AN INEFFECTIVE POLICY:
The Use of Signing Statements by the Bush II Administration Has
Failed as a Policy Strategy.
Having concluded that the use of signing statements by the Bush II
administration does not violate judicial constitutional principles, and are more
effectively viewed as a political exercise in constitutional construction, the
question remains whether they are an appropriate or effective exercise of that
power.
1. The policy limits of political construction.
Unlike judicial constitutional construction, in which disputes between the
executive and legislative branches are refereed by the judiciary, which ultimately
declares a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser,’ the outcome of political construction battles are
not so decisive. Political construction reflects a process more than an issue
specific outcome, and the results are measured over time. Throughout this
process, Whittington observes, “[t]he balance of powers [is] adjusted over time to
match different political needs and different systems of political values.” 57
Whittington sees the success or failure of a particular political construction policy
as being determined by various mechanisms that impact the stability of that
construction. He identifies one of these mechanisms as “ideological, or the
articulation of a persuasive conception of constitutional meaning that is then
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widely adopted among relevant political actors.” 58 Another mechanism for
stabilizing political construction involves “the structuring of political support.” 59
While this mechanism does not require widespread acceptance, it does require
convincing “all parties [of the relevant coalition] that a commitment to the
construction, or at least a lack of hostility to the construction, is necessary to their
own political success.”60
Using these mechanisms as guideposts, one can readily deduce the factors
to be evaluated in determining the success or failure of a given political
construction. First, the extent to which the construction at issue has actually been
adopted must be considered. Second, irrespective of its immediate adoption, one
must consider the acceptance (or rejection) of the construction as an ideological
concept. Finally, the political support generated behind the construction, as well
as the political opposition generated, should be considered. Measured against
each of these yardsticks, the use of signing statements by the Bush II
administration has not been successful.
2. President Bush’s use of signing statements has not been adopted, nor have
the political positions he has sought to advance through signing statements.
The widespread use of signing statements by the Bush II administration is
not a measure of success. That is, of course, because they are entirely unilateral.
They require neither agreement nor a decision not to oppose them, as neither
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Congress nor the courts have a mechanism to challenge them at the time they are
issued.
On the other hand, the success of their underlying objectives is a fair
proxy for the success of signing statements in general. One of the principle
objectives advanced for signing statements was to increase the President’s
influence over legislation, and better position him to push through his legislative
agenda. There is no evidence that this has in fact occurred. The success of the
signing statement can be judged partially on the success rate presidents have had
pushing their agenda through Congress. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports
has published the presidential success rate with Congress. This information,
while surely affected by other variables, suggests that signing statements did not
successfully push the president’s agenda through Congress:

Reagan

Bush I

Year - Success Rate Year - Success Rate

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

-

2.4%
72.4%
67.1%
65.8%
59.9%
56.1%
43.5%
47.4%

1989
1990
1991
1992

-

62.6%
46.8%
54.2%
43.0%

Clinton
Year - Success Rate

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

-

86.4%
86.4%
36.3%
55.1%
53.6%
50.6%
37.8 %
55.0%

Bush II
Year - Success Rate

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

-

86.7%
78.8%
78.7%
72.6%
78.0%

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, December 19,1992, p.3896; December
21, 1996, p.3428; January 3, 1988, p. 13; January 9, 1999, p.86; December 14, 2002,
p.3275; December 11, 2004; January 9, 2006. Qtd. in Pfiffner, James P. The Modern
Presidency. 5th ed. United States: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005. 166.
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This information shows that in each of the four administrations discussed, the
president’s success rate with Congress dropped significantly from the first to the
second term. While George W. Bush’s success rate dropped the least of the four
presidents, it still is on a downward trend. Moreover, this information is
unavailable after 2005, when democrats took control of Congress. A swing in
power to Democrats in Congress since 2005 suggests that Bush II’s success rate
has most likely fallen significantly since 2005.
The evidence is even more compelling when it comes to specific aspects
of Bush II’s legislative agenda. For example, a principal target of his signing
statements has been legislation relating to the war in Iraq. In 2006, he issued a
signing statement with respect to the so-called McCain Amendment to the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2006, which categorically prohibits cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment of any and all detainees by all U.S personnel, wherever
they are located. In language typical of his other signing statements, President
Bush stated that in executing the statute he could interpret in “in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authority of the president to supervise the
unitary executive branch and as commander-in-chief and consistent with the
constitutional limits on judicial power.” 61 He recently issued a similar statement
in connection with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, reserving his
right to ignore aspects of the legislation addressing his duty to faithfully execute
the law:
Today, I have signed into law H.R. 4986, the
61
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008. The Act authorizes funding for the defense of
the United States and its interests abroad, for
military construction, and for national securityrelated energy programs.
Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846,
1079, and 1222, purport to impose requirements
that could inhibit the President's ability to carry out
his constitutional obligations to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, to protect national
security, to supervise the executive branch, and to
execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The
executive branch shall construe such provisions in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority
of the President.
George W. Bush The White House, January 28,
2008.

H.R. 4986, approved January 28, was

assigned Public Law No. 110-181.62

Have these statements been effective in preserving presidential authority
in these areas? The evidence suggests the answer is “no.” There are no concrete
examples of the Bush II administration actually refusing to enforce clear
legislative mandate, or to adopt an interpretation obviously contrary to that
intended by Congress. Whether this is because situations have not arisen that
would require the administration to take this position, or because the
administration has not wanted to escalate confrontation around these issues, the
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fact remains that the administration has simply not used the turf staked out by its
signing statements. Moreover, the administration’s position on these issues is
generally unpopular, both politically and with the public in general.
Indeed, it can be fairly said that President Bush’s historically low approval
ratings generally, and those with respect to his conduct of the Iraq war in
particular, suggest a general failure with respect to his war policies. In this
context, his attempt to expand and consolidate his presidential power with respect
to virtually any issue touching upon the war cannot be viewed as a success. And
while, under Whittington’s view, the ultimate proof must be measured over a
longer period, it does not appear from the success—or lack thereof—of the
initiatives of the Bush II administration that a foundation has been laid for
expanded presidential powers going forward.
Another objective of signing statements was to give the president a place
at the table when it comes to legislative interpretation. This objective has been a
complete failure. Following the lead of a number of scholars who have argued
that signing statements should be given “no weight” in interpreting legislation, the
Roberts Court held that the contemporaneous views of the president are virtually
irrelevant to the process of determining a statute’s meaning.63
Alasdair Roberts, Professor of Public Administration in the Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, has theorized
that the United States is in a postmillennial liberal state that has weakened the
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authority of the president.64 Due to this, the presidency cannot be as strong as it
was in the mid-twentieth century. Roberts claims that in response to the decline
of presidential power in this period, Bush II has attempted to expand his power of
command:
The 9/11 attacks were regarded as an opportunity
to revive presidential authority. More than five
years after the attacks, it should be possible to
assess whether this goal has been achieved. It is
necessary, when doing this, to look beyond
individual battles about presidential prerogative –
the fight over presidential signing statements or
over the breadth of executive privilege, for example
– and consider instead the overall outcome of the
struggle over executive power.65

Roberts concludes that Bush II has done very little to affect the constraints on the
presidency and to increase executive power – two main goals of signing
statements.66 Because the signing statement failed to achieve these goals it can be
rendered a failed policy. Furthermore, the attempt to expand presidential
authority contributed to the negative perception of the second Bush administration
being an “imperial presidency.”
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3. The ideology underlying Bush II’s use of signing statements has not been
widely accepted.
The Bush II administration believes that it is appropriate to routinely issue
signing statements questioning an enormous number of legislative provisions in
order to expand presidential power. Putting aside the fact that this policy has not
worked, the underlying ideology has not been widely accepted outside the
administration. Even those who espouse the use of signing statements generally
have criticized the Bush II approach. Perhaps the most stark example of this
mindset is Walter Dellinger, one of the early architects of signing statement
policy as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel from 1993 to
1996. While Dellinger continues to defend the use of signing statements and the
authority of the executive branch to refuse to enforce legislative provisions he
believes to be unconstitutional, he cannot defend the Bush II approach to signing
statements. Indeed, Dellinger believes that this administration has relied upon a
warped interpretation of his analysis in 1994 to justify its policy. Specifically,
Dellinger emphasized that a president
Should presume laws are valid and accord great
deference to Congress’ views that its acts are
consistent with the Constitution. A president should
also recognize that, while the Supreme Court is not
the sole arbiter of constitutionality, it plays a
special role in resolving such questions.” If
conscientiously followed, these principles reduce
the risk that a president will assert a dubious claim
of unconstitutionality in order to sidestep a law he
simply doesn’t like. The Bush [II] administration’s
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frequent and seemingly cavalier refusal to enforce
laws, which is aggravated by its avoidance of
judicial review and eve public disclosure of its
actions, places it at odds with these principles and
with predecessors of both parties.67

This abuse, Dellinger contends, reflects a deeper problem: the Bush II
“administration’s extravagant claims to unilateral authority to govern.”68
Similarly, while Professor Laurence Tribe agrees that signing statements
are largely “informative and constitutionally unobjectionable,” he concludes that
this administration has abused the practice.69 He finds the practice “objectionable
not by virtue of the signing statements themselves but rather by virtue of the
president’s refusal to face the political music by issuing a veto and subjecting that
veto to the possibility of an override by Congress.”70
Rather than articulating a “persuasive conception of constitutional
meaning” around signing statements, as Whittington suggests71, this
administration has simply bulldozed ahead, alienating even those who are
sympathetic to the use of signing statements. In the absence of broad-based
ideological support, this policy is unlikely to have any long-term traction.
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4. Bush II’s use of signing statements has fostered mistrust and hostility in
Congress.
Unsurprisingly, the Bush II administration’s use of signing statements to
unilaterally expand presidential power has not been well received in Congress.
The adverse reaction is not new. Indeed, following President Reagan’s use of a
signing statement in connection with his execution of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, Barney Frank commented that the practice constituted
“the gravest usurpation of legislative prerogative I can think of.” 72 While the
rhetoric has remained harsh, the threat has grown in the eyes of Congress as it has
evolved into a perceived frontal assault on the legislative function. In a Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing on ”Presidential Signing Statements” held on June
27, 2006, Ranking Member Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) remarked:

We are at a pivotal moment in our Nation’s history,
where Americans are faced with a President who
makes sweeping claims for almost unchecked
Executive power. One of the most troubling aspects
of such claims is the President’s unprecedented use
of signing statements. Historically, those
statements have served as public announcements
containing comments from the President. But this
administration has taken what was otherwise a
press release and transformed it into a
proclamation stating which parts of the law the
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President will follow and which parts he will simply
ignore.73
This view is by no means limited to Congressional Democrats. Indeed,
Republican Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, has asserted that the legislative authority of Congress “doesn’t
amount to anything if the president can say, ‘My constitutional authority
supersedes the statute.’ And I think we’ve got to lay down the gauntlet and
challenge him on it.” And Senator Specter did. On July 26, 2006, Senator
Specter introduced a bill granting legislators legal standing to bring litigation
challenging the legality of signing statements.74 In advancing this legislation, he
stated:
The President cannot use a signing statement to
rewrite the words of a statute nor can the President
use a signing statement to selectively nullify those
provisions he does not like. This much is clear from
the Constitution…If the President is permitted to
rewrite the bills that Congress passes and cherry
pick which provisions he likes and does not like, he
subverts the constitutional process designed by our
Framers.75
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The proposed legislation reflected Congress’s anger at the power play that the
Bush II administration’s use of signing statements represented. It also reflected
the frustration of not being able to confront them directly, because the Supreme
Court had consistently ruled that legislators do not have legal standing to
challenge such actions in court because they have not suffered the requisite
“injury.” Specifically, the Supreme Court has granted standing to legislators only
in cases involving the nullification of a specific vote.76 Issuance of a signing
statement questioning the constitutionality of a legislative provision or indicating
the intent not to enforce a provision in the future does not rise to the level of vote
nullification under these cases.
Congress’s extreme reaction has further fanned the flames of hostility
between Congress and the Bush II administration. Such hostility cannot, of
course, be contained within the single issue of signing statements or the bills that
they affect. Indeed, they have been used in so many statutes that this “limitation”
would not be all that limiting.

76

Raines v. Byrd, no. 96-1671, Supreme Ct. of the US, 27 May 1997.

65

CONCLUSION

VI

Recent debates over presidential signing statements have mistakenly
focused solely on legal arguments concerning the constitutionality of this practice.
This narrow focus overlooks the fact that signing statements have historically
been used as a policy by the executive branch to advance the presidential agenda.
It also forces analysis of them into a limited analytical model, based solely upon
legal precedent, that does not fully capture the relevant issues. This traditional
model suggests that signing statements are constitutional and therefore
appropriate, despite the fact that broad criticism of signing statements persists.
Analyzing signing statements not in terms of their constitutionality but as
executive policy permits a deeper assessment of these concerns, and more far
reaching conclusions with respect to their advisability.
Equating constitutionality with good policy conflates two completely
separate issues. Analyzing the efficacy of signing statements as policy
demonstrates that they are not good policy despite the fact that they are likely
constitutional. Thus, they provide a concrete example of why these two analyses
are distinct. The inverse is also true; that is, an effective policy might not pass
constitutional muster. An example of this might be the line item veto. Passed by
Congress and signed by President Clinton, many believed that the line item veto
was effective policy that helped to streamline the legislative process and limited
the opportunity for legislators to hold up important legislation by adding on
partisan or pork barrel provisions. However, the Supreme Court ruled in Clinton
v City of New York that the line item veto unconstitutionally transferred to the
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president a function allocated to Congress.77 This was so even though Congress
approved the transfer.
Since the Reagan administration, signing statements have been used
extensively and even after numerous variations of use, they have not served their
intended purpose as a policy. Using the concepts of presidential power set forth
by Neustadt, Kernell and Howell (power of persuasion, going public and
unilateral action), presidents for over two decades attempted to use signing
statements to increase executive influence in the legislative process. After failed
attempts to create an effective policy by four administrations, it is apparent that
signing statements are bad policy and cannot be made more effective. In fact, the
recent use of signing statements has been counterproductive. They have
generated a great deal of hostility between the executive and legislative branches,
and widespread criticism by legal scholars and the general public.
The teaching of this paper reaches beyond its conclusions about
presidential signing statements. It demonstrates the importance of utilizing an
analytical framework that is broad enough to capture the salient issues and
concerns raised by the issue presented. When it comes to turf battles between the
branches of government—of which signing statements are an example—the
traditional analysis has all too often been limited to legal assessments based upon
separation of powers principles. Expanding the analysis to include policy issues
broadens, deepens and strengthens the analysis and the resulting conclusions.
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Beginning in 2006, Charlie Savage, a political columnist for The Boston
Globe, began writing a series of articles on the use of signing statements by
President George W. Bush. Since then, presidential signing statements have been
the subject of much debate. My original goal at the outset of this project was to
examine the constitutionality of presidential signing statements within the context
of separation of powers principles. However, it became evident that many of the
legal arguments for and against the use of signing statements have been exhausted
without a clear resolution. Ultimately, I found the arguments that they were
unconstitutional unconvincing, and yet was still troubled by how they were being
used.
At this point, my lack of legal expertise became advantageous as I started
examining the signing statement as a policy instead of exclusively as a legal issue.
What I came to realize is that many of the legal arguments being made were based
on issues of policy rather than legality. By assessing signing statements within an
analytical framework based upon policy rather than constitutionality, the issue of
signing statements became a canvas on which to examine the correlation between
policy arguments and constitutional examination in conventional policy analysis.
To illustrate the premise of this argument, the four-cell table below
represents the full spectrum of analysis that can be utilized in assessing behavior
by one branch that potentially intrudes upon the domain of another. Using signing
statements as an example, this paper argues that conventional analysis based upon
legal/constitutional principles underutilizes the full range of available analysis and
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confines the arguments to an unduly narrow perspective. With reference to this
table, traditional analysis is limited to cells 1 and 4 of the table, essentailly
equating constitutionality with good policy, and vice versa.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY-POLICY MODEL

CONSTITUTIONALITY
Constitutional Unconstitutional

POLICY

Good
Policy
Bad
Policy

1

2

3

4

Utilizing the entire table above suggests a policy can be both good and
unconstitutional, or bad policy can be constitutional. A policy must be judged on
effectiveness, feasibility and a cost-benefit analysis to see if it will successfully
fulfill its intended purpose. Constitutionality is determined to establish whether
or not a policy can be implemented without violating legal principles. By
separating constitutional arguments from policy analysis, it becomes easier to
effectively and unabashedly evaluate a policy.
The methods used to perform this study were two-fold. First, the legal
arguments both for and against the use of signing statements were briefly
identified, and it was concluded that signing statements are not a violation of the
Constitution, at least at the time they are made. This conclusion provided the
foundation for making the larger connection between constitutionality and policy.
There are solid legal arguments on both sides of this issue, but there is yet to be
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any empirical evidence that signing statements have caused harm to the public by
violating the Constitution. The primary sources used in the first section of the
paper were from law reviews, scholarly studies on signing statements, reports on
the use of signing statements and original White House documents regarding the
implementation of signing statements.
Second, the use of signing statements was examined from the Reagan
administration to the George W. Bush administration. Using three theories of
presidential exertion of power – the power of persuasion, going public and
unilateral action – signing statements were identified as an executive policy used
to advance the president’s agenda in Congress and to have presidential
interpretation become a part of legislative history.
The two-dimensional analysis of this paper concludes that signing
statements are constitutional, but are a bad policy. Particularly as utilized by
George W. Bush, signing statements have not been effective in either expanding
presidential policy generally, or specifically his political or legislative agenda.
Not only did the implementation of the signing statement not achieve its attended
goals, it created controversy over the exertion of presidential authority in the
second Bush administration. And while this policy was not expensive to
implement, it was costly by creating negative publicity for the Bush
administration (e.g. the Charlie Savage articles). In the end, the costs of
implementing this policy far outweigh the benefits. One of the advantages of
examining policy using the constitutionality- policy model is that a good policy
that violates the Constitution can sometimes be altered to be legally implemented
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and vice versa for a bad policy. In the case of signing statements, their use as an
exertion of presidential influence on legislation have been exhausted and they
cannot be modified into a good policy.
This paper provides important insights into how policy is examined when
the issue of constitutionality is involved. The more thorough analysis provided in
the constitutionality-policy model helped frame the recent debate over
presidential signing statements as a policy issue rather than one of
constitutionality and from that perspective concluded that signing statements are
bad policy regardless of constitutionality. The broader significance of this paper
is the expansive use of policy analysis that separates the traditional coupling of
constitutionality with policy analysis. This model can be used to reexamine old
policies and new policy proposals. The expectation is that this new analysis will
allow for the modification of policies before they are disregarded because they are
deemed unconstitutional and so that bad policies are not implemented purely on
the basis of their constitutionality.

